Cassandra Scipio v. Commissioner Social Security by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-11-2015 
Cassandra Scipio v. Commissioner Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Cassandra Scipio v. Commissioner Social Security" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 476. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/476 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
 
Cassandra Y. Scipio, 
        Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-04562) 
District Judge:  Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2015 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 







                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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 Appellant Cassandra Scipio appeals the District Court’s order affirming the final 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her request for disability 
insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under the Social 
Security Act (the “Act”).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.  
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly 
summarize the essential facts.  In 2008, Scipio filed applications for DIB and SSI.  She 
alleged that she was disabled, and thus entitled to these benefits, as a result of a stroke 
and difficulty with walking and breathing.  After Scipio’s application was denied, she 
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).  Before the ALJ, the 
parties presented a variety of documentary evidence, including medical and mental-health 
evaluations from several physicians.  In February 2009, after holding a hearing, the ALJ 
denied Scipio’s request for benefits.  Scipio appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals 
Council, which denied review. 
 Scipio then sought review in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  On June 7, 2010, the District Court remanded the case for 
further administrative proceedings, determining that the ALJ failed to fully discuss all of 
the relevant medical evidence in the case and, therefore, did not support his finding with 
substantial evidence.  On remand, the ALJ held another administrative hearing in the case 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
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at which Scipio testified.  The ALJ issued a new decision on March 24, 2011, finding that 
Scipio was not disabled.  In rendering this decision, the ALJ applied the five-step 
sequential evaluation process for determining disability.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) 
and § 416.920(a); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).1  Specifically, the 
ALJ concluded that there was no objective medical evidence demonstrating that Scipio 
had ever had a cerebrovascular accident (“CVA” or stroke) or a transient ischemic attack 
(“TIA”).  Although the ALJ did find that Scipio had a medically determinable mental 
impairment, he concluded that there was no evidence that the impairment was so severe 
as to significantly limit Scipio’s ability to do basic work activities.  As part of this 
finding, the ALJ determined that Scipio’s subjective complaints of pain were not entirely 
credible because they were contradicted, at least in part, by the medical evidence.  
Consequently, the ALJ determined that Scipio was not disabled and thus not entitled to 
DIB or SSI. 
 On July 6, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Scipio’s exceptions to the decision, 
and accordingly, the ALJ’s March 24, 2011 decision became the Commissioner’s final 
decision.  Scipio commenced another civil action in the District Court seeking review of 
                                              
1 The Commissioner must determine: (1) whether the applicant has engaged in substantial 
gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date; (2) whether the applicant has a 
severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment or 
combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listed impairment; (4) whether, 
despite the severe impairment, the applicant retains the residual functional capacity to 
perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the applicant is capable of performing 
other jobs that exist in the national economy, considering her age, education, work 
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that decision.  The District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation over Scipio’s counseled objections, affirmed the ALJ’s decision.  
Scipio filed a timely notice of appeal from the District Court’s order. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g).  Like the District Court, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings — including 
credibility determinations — if they are supported by substantial evidence.  See 
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005); Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 
113, 130 (3d Cir. 2002).  Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552 
(quotation marks omitted).  It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less 
than a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
  In her informal brief, Scipio primarily disputes the ALJ’s finding that she did not 
have a stroke.  Scipio claimed that, in August 2007, she suffered a stroke and that she had 
several mini-strokes thereafter.  Scipio indicated that as a result of those strokes, she has 
experienced various impairments, including memory loss and difficulty ambulating.  The 
ALJ determined that the medical record of evidence did not document Scipio’s ever 
having experienced a CVA or TIA, or any resultant limitations.  Thus, Scipio’s alleged 
stroke was not a medically determinable impairment. 
 Eligibility for disability insurance benefits under the SSA is conditioned on 
                                                                                                                                                  
experience, and residual functional capacity.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).  
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compliance with all relevant requirements of the statute.  “[A] disability is established 
where the claimant demonstrates that there is some medically determinable basis for an 
impairment that prevents [her] from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a 
statutory twelve-month period.”  Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38-39 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 423(d)(1)(A).  A “medically determinable” impairment is one that results from 
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities demonstrable by medically 
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). 
  We agree that the available records documenting Scipio’s neurological or 
cardiovascular health during the relevant period supported the ALJ’s conclusion that 
Scipio did not experience a CVA or TIA.  As the ALJ discussed, although the record is 
replete with Scipio’s subjective complaints that she experienced strokes, there is simply 
no clinical or objective evidence to support her claims.  To the contrary, the evidence in 
the form of MRI and MRA results reasonably supported a finding that she did not, at any 
point, experience a CVA or TIA.  Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 
determination. 
 Scipio also argues in her brief that the ALJ improperly assessed her credibility.  
However, we agree with the District Court that the ALJ’s credibility finding was fully 
explained and supported by substantial evidence.  When making determinations as to a 
claimant’s credibility, an ALJ must “determine the extent to which a claimant is 
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accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he or she is disabled by it.”  
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).  In assessing Scipio’s credibility, 
the ALJ found that Scipio had made numerous misrepresentations to medical providers 
regarding her medical conditions.  Specifically, although Scipio repeatedly claimed that 
she had suffered a stroke, there was no medical evidence to support her claim.  And, 
although Scipio claimed that she was unable to work or perform daily activities as a 
result of her symptoms, the ALJ noted that no treating or evaluating physician has ever 
suggested that Scipio cannot work because of her impairment.  See id. at 363 (holding 
that the ALJ properly evaluated credibility where he “cited specific instances where 
[claimant’s] complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent 
with” the objective medical evidence of record).  Accordingly, we will not disturb the 
ALJ’s findings on this ground.   
 We have considered Scipio’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that 
they are without merit.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
